I heartily accept the motto, "That government is best which governs least"; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe—"That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. (...) The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of a culture of responsibility in balancing ethics, the market, and new technologies from a civil law perspective. It challenges the prevailing view that expands corporate liability whilst treating consumers as prima facie vulnerable. Adopting a constitutional legality framework that prioritises existential over patrimonial relations, the article argues that democracy is consolidated not merely by affirming rights, but through exercising duties. It proposes a paradigm shift from the “vulnerable consumer” to the “responsible consumer”, an agent (...) who bears social responsibility for the ethical implications of their consumption, particularly regarding the rights of other market actors like workers. Furthermore, the paper underscores the duty of self-protection, especially in the digital age, contending that the right to informational self-determination is ineffective if individuals do not actively safeguard their own privacy. Ultimately, the essay posits that fostering this culture of responsibility is an essential prerequisite for strengthening democratic principles in a globalised society. (shrink)

Political liberalism holds that some kinds of disagreement give rise to a duty of restraint. On this view, citizens ought to limit the considerations they invoke in political advocacy to those that meet a certain kind of publicity requirement. Many of the arguments for political liberalism's duty of restraint contain a grain of truth. But properly understood, these arguments instead support the duty of responsiveness, which directs citizens to respond to disagreement in a very different way than (...) the duty of restraint recommends. (shrink)

One of the principal aims of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, especially of the Doctrine of Virtue, is to present a taxonomy of our duties as human beings. The basic division of duties is between juridical duties and ethical duties, which determines the division of the Metaphysics of Morals into the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. Juridical duties are duties that may be coercively enforced from outside the agent, as by the civil or criminal laws, or other social (...) pressures. Ethical duties must not be externally enforced (to do so violates the right of the person coerced). Instead, the subject herself, through her own reason and the feelings and motives arising a priori from her rational capacities -- the feelings of respect, conscience, moral feeling and love of other human beings, must constrain herself to follow them (MS 6:399-404).1 Among ethical duties, the fundamental division is between duties to oneself and duties to others. Within each of these two main divisions of ethical duty, there is a further division between duties that are strictly owed, requiring specific actions or omissions, and whose violation incurs moral blame, and duties that are wide or meritorious, the specific actions not strictly owed, but deserving of moral credit or merit. Kant treats these latter as ‘duties’ (eschewing any category such as ‘supererogation’) because the actions in question are conceived as fit objects of self-constraint – things we can make ourselves do through the exercise of reason and the moral feelings arising from the application of practical reason to our faculty of desire. Regarding duties to oneself, this division is between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duty; regarding duties to others, the strict or narrow... (shrink)

This paper seeks to investigate and assess a particular form of relationship between the State and its citizens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely that of obedience to the law and its related right of protest through civil disobedience. We do so by conducting an analysis and normative evaluation of two cases of disobedience to the law: (1) healthcare professionals refusing to attend work as a protest against unsafe working conditions, and (2) citizens who use public demonstration and (...) deliberately ignore measures of social distancing as a way of protesting against lockdown. While different in many aspects, both are substantially similar with respect to one element: their respective protesters both rely on unlawful actions in order to bring change to a policy they consider unjust. We question the extent to which healthcare professionals may participate in civil disobedience with respect to the duty of care intrinsic to the medical profession, and the extent to which opponents of lockdown and confinement measures may reasonably engage in protests without endangering the lives and basic rights of non-dissenting citizens. Drawing on a contractualist normative framework, our analysis leads us to conclude that while both cases qualify as civil disobedience in the descriptive sense, only the case of healthcare professionals qualifies as morally justified civil disobedience. (shrink)

This new scholarly edition of Samuel Pufendorf's seminal The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature is among the first to suggest a purely conventional basis for natural law. Pufendorf wrote this work to make his insights accessible to a wide range of readers, especially university students, who were struggling with issues of church and state. Although indebted to Hobbes and Grotius, the work outlines a new understanding of ethics and politics, one suited to states that (...) were emerging from the aftermath of religious civil war. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Definitions Justification and the Duty to Obey.

Civility is a paradoxical virtue. For some, civility is not a virtue at all, but rather is an important civic duty, operating as a synonym for other civic dispositions generally valued, such as respect or tolerance. For some others, civility has a dark side and is used by those with power to question and silence the voices and interests of others. On the other hand, and more positively, civility is a vital and often invoked virtue (...) for political life and debate—a virtue that also holds moral relevance. It is certainly the case that a (real or perceived) lack of civility and a prevalence of incivility is generally regarded as a vice and as damaging to healthy civic discourse and relationships. Despite repeated calls for greater civility in public life, the concept remains contested and hard to pin down precisely. The key question is whether—and if so, precisely why—civility should be considered a virtue. In The Virtue of Civility, a diverse group of leading scholars offer their insights and analysis into civility as a virtue. They bring a wide range of cultural and philosophical perspectives as they think through and define civility within democracies today. The result is a comprehensive, critical, and compelling account of civility as a virtue. (shrink)

Acts of civil disobedience, which imply the open violation of a legal directive, often result in the forceful imposition of a choice upon others (e.g. blockades). This is sometimes justifiable, within a democracy, in cases of ‘democratic deficit’, namely, when fundamental rights of an oppressed minority are at stake. In this article, I claim that the use of physical force, in a democracy, may also be justified by the rights of (at least some of) the very people upon whom force (...) is applied. Focusing on the nature of civil disobedience as a ‘form of address’, I argue: (1) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena does not entail infringing upon their status as autonomous agents; (2) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena may contribute to the fulfilment of a positive duty to promote the autonomy of (at least some of) those very people upon whom force is applied. This is not a defence of paternalism: I claim that using force against others, in the democratic arena, may be constitutive of a behaviour that treats others with the respect due to their status as autonomous agents. (shrink)

The self-worth of political communities is often understood to be an expression of their position in a hierarchy of power; if so, then the desire for self-worth is a source of competition and conflict in international relations. In early modern German natural law theories, one finds the alternative view, according to which duties of esteem toward political communities should reflect the degree to which they fulfill the functions of civil government. The present article offers a case study, examining the views (...) concerning confederation rights and the resulting duties of esteem in diplomatic relations developed by Christoph Besold (1577–1638). Besold defends the view that confederations including dependent communities—such as the Hanseatic League—could fulfill a stabilizing political function. He also uses sixteenth-century conceptions concerning the acquisition of sovereignty rights through prescription of immemorial time. Both strands of argument lead to the conclusion that the envoys of dependent communities can have the right to be recognized as ambassadors, with all the duties of esteem that follow from this recognition. (shrink)

The dissertation seeks to characterize the style of government embodied in Adam Smith's vision of civil society. It is composed of two parts. The first, preparatory part develops a framework for offering a historically sensitive interpretation of Smith's works by drawing on and criticizing the treatment of the eighteenth century in the work of several contemporary political theorists and historians of political thought. Part II gives the full-fledged interpretation of Smith's thought, based on both detailed textual interpretation and broad contextual (...) juxtaposition. Smith's highly systematic knowledge of the governance of conduct in civil society forms an innovative response to a political problem first articulated in sixteenth-century raison d'etat, reformulated in seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence, the eighteenth-century discourse of polite sociability and its Mandevillean critique, and posed in acute form by Hume. The problem was how to secure the survival, and enhance the strength, of the political order under conditions both of international military-commercial competition and potentially devastating internal social conflict that could eventuate in the kinds of civil wars that wracked the seventeenth century. ;Accepting Hume's reduction of civil society to an immanent plane devoid of providential guarantee of social harmony, Smith shows, in a first moment, how individuals in civil society are able to govern themselves freely and naturally, and how social order is produced and reproduced naturally. The sympathetic sociability and the natural development of the individual's conscience and sense of duty depicted in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the commercial society depicted in the Wealth of Nations seem to obviate the need for invasive political governance. To this extent, Smith's "system of natural liberty" entails a minimal style of governance, oriented around the negative activity of administering justice, that is, of protecting individuals' rights by preventing and punishing injustice. However, Smith observes that the contemporary form of civil society necessarily produces among those he calls "the labouring poor," who constitute "the great body of the people," the very forces of "faction" and "fanaticism" that threaten to destroy political authority and social tranquillity. In response, Smith theorizes a more minute, controlling style of governance, oriented around the positive activity of forming and reforming the unruly lower ranks through habituation to a condition of orderliness, discipline and moderation. Smith takes up a series of existing practices for moderating conduct and forming character---practices embodied in educational, military, religious, manufactory and even recreational institutions---and projects them into an overall governmental strategy, theoretically unifying them by means of the jurisprudential category of police. Commerce, polite sociability, the self-governing individual, the practice of justice, the stability of government---in short, civil society as such---turn out to be dependent on the effective subjection of the great body of the people to police institutions. In Smith's comprehensive picture of civil society and government, justice and police represent not an ideal for civil society and its unfortunate but merely de facto subversion, respectively, but rather two ideals of civil society which exist in a relationship of uneasy complementarity. (shrink)

Debates concerning Rawls’s definition of civil disobedience have been the focus of much of the discussion on civil disobedience since the publication of A Theory of Justice. However, in this paper I will be focusing on a question about Rawls’s view of civil disobedience that has been largely ignored in the literature. Throughout the section on the justification of civil disobedience, Rawls clearly and explicitly says that people have a right to engage in civil disobedience, provided that all of the (...) conditions for civil disobedience are met. My question is: Can we say something stronger than people have a right to engage in civil disobedience? In other words, is it possible that people have either a duty or an obligation to engage in civil disobedience under certain circumstances? If so, who has these duties or obligations—would everyone in the state have these duties and/or obligations, or just some people? In this paper I propose to carefully examine what Rawls has to say about political obligations and the natural duty of justice, and see what light I can shed on the question of an obligation or duty to engage in civil disobedience from a Rawlsian perspective. (shrink)

Faced with a choice between escaping without consequences and submitting to a democratic decision, Socrates chooses the latter. So immense is Socrates’ duty to obey law, we are led to believe, that even the threat of death is insufficient to abrogate it. Crito proposes several arguments purporting to ground Socrates’ strong duty to obey, with the appeal to the Athenian system’s democratic credentials carrying most of the normative weight. A careful reading of the dialogue, in conjunction with the (...) ‘Apology’, reveals, however, a more complex picture. If Crito sets the conditions that render a regime legitimate, and therefore warranting of obedience, the Apology reveals a legal system’s shortcomings that justify disobedience. This article substantiates this position by delineating circumstances that can justify resistance. Contemporary forms of political resistance can also rely on similar conditions. Plato’s texts anticipate the current democratic turn of civil disobedience. (shrink)

The article considers the notary as a subject of active influence on the formation of postmodern democratic legal society, mediation of law in postmodern society. The constitutional definition of the state in this status does not mean that the civil law consciousness prevails in all spheres of its life. Since no person in society does not need this type of legal service, it is quite objective to consider this community as a subject whose activities should be considered as a subject (...) of formation not only of legal consciousness of society but also a leading subject of civil society. This primarily applies to private notaries, who, unlike public notaries, are fully responsible for the results of their activities. After all, a legal duty is organically combined with the responsibility from which the public notary is released. The study of the manifestations of the phenomenon of postmodernism is relevant to many disciplines, including - the philosophy of law. Modern research shows that classical types of legal understanding do not satisfy the understanding of postmodern law, which indicates the need to find a fundamentally new concept of law. The author concludes that the solution to this problem should be sought in the field of theories that offer new approaches to the interpretation of legal texts; this area is considered the most promising. (shrink)

McCullough and colleagues draw an historical line from the writings of Percival, who found himself resolving arguments (sometimes violent) between physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, to the concept of civility as a professional virtue and duty. The authors show that civility is a prerequisite to effective cooperation, which itself underpins patient safety and positive clinical outcomes—desirable endpoints of any discussion about healthcare. They exhort academic leaders to teach, role model and reward correct behaviours.1 Why then, as a clinician (...) manager with a deep interest in fostering civility and psychological safety, am I not satisfied? Three reasons: the paper does not adequately explore the reasons why, its focus is largely restricted to academic institutions, and it does not encompass the non-clinical workforce; as a result, its proposed solutions appear ungrounded. Why are ‘good people’, who were attracted to careers that demand altruism and empathy, uncivil in the workplace? What are the competing goals that result in curt, disrespectful or downright rude exchanges? This has been studied. Leape et al concluded that endogenous factors such as personality, insecurity, anxiety, depression, narcissism and responses to prior …. (shrink)

The notion of resistance to the state has come to be bandied about a great deal, and a great many political movements place themselves under its sign. This intrusion of violence into the realm of the law seems to be spreading since the advocates of insurrection, who accuse the state of betraying its mission, are not those who consider revolt to be the necessary first step towards any kind of affranchisement. Where the partisans of revolution believe that violence is, in (...) Marx's words, “the midwife of every old society that carries a new one within it” and that it is “the instrument by which the social movement sweeps it away and breaks to pieces the political forms that are fixed and dead,” the partisans of the right to resist the state do not share these hopes for political and social upheavals. Marxist theory, which praises revolutionary insurrection, stands opposed to a kind of philosophy that admits of armed opposition to the state, but can nevertheless be called liberal in two respects: formally, from its present perspective, where it appears opposed to Marxist thought, and also historically, in the evolution of political ideas, where it is opposed to absolutist conceptions of the state. For, as R. Derathé remarked, the question of the right to resist “cast light on the chasm that separated the theologians from the legal experts.” The doctrines of divine right left no room for envisaging a limitation on the duty of obedience, without turning such a limitation into the equivalent of a revolt against God. Bossuet, in his Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte, asserts that “God has made the kings and the princes his lieutenants on earth so as to render their authority sacred and inviolable.” The result is unconditional obedience to the kings and to all those who hold a parcel of authority: “Declared impiety and even persecution do not exempt the subjects from the obedience they owe to their princes.” The only possible attitude in the face of “the violence of the princes” is to submit “respectful remonstrances, without mutiny and without a murmur, and with prayers for their conversion.” It is also necessary to ban “remonstrances full of bitterness and grumbling” since these “are the beginnings of sedition, which must not be tolerated.”. (shrink)

Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often (...) increase the expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, (b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed reciprocally. The conclusion—that we have a pro tanto reason for adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign innocents in war—has implications for not only what standards of risk we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives. (shrink)

While philosophers usually agree that there is room for civil disobedience in democratic societies, they disagree as to the proper justification and role of civil disobedience. The field has so far been divided into two camps—the liberal approach on the one hand, which associates the justification and role of civil disobedience with the good of justice, and the democratic approach on the other, which connects them with the value and good of democracy. William Smith’s Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy offers (...) a ‘deliberative’ theory, which constitutes an attractive synthesis of the two camps as it conceives of civil disobedience as a guardian of both justice and deliberative democracy. In this review essay, I first revisit the ‘problem’ of civil disobedience, examining in particular the two pillars of the case against civil disobedience as Smith depicts it, namely, the prohibition on legal disobedience established by the moral duty to comply, and the notion that civil disobedience strains the bonds of civic friendship. I suggest, contra, that the duty to comply as Smith defends it fails to be comprehensive because it is tightly bound to deliberative democratic procedures, which are involved in the making of only a portion of authoritative decisions; and, contra, that civil disobedience does not strain, but instead invigorates, civic friendship. Second, I entertain the possibility that citizens have a moral duty, not a mere right, to resist injustice. I show that Smith’s theory, in particular his account of the moral duty to comply, provides the resources to defend a general duty to resist injustice which, depending on the circumstances, can demand protesting the law or frustrating injustice. Third, I contend that Smith’s conception of the different contexts of injustice—he identifies three main ones—should be expanded to include what I call ‘official disrespect’ and ‘deliberative ignorance’. I argue that each context offers reasons to disobey the law but not necessarily in the civil manner determined by Smith. (shrink)

What are our responsibilities in the face of injustice? Many philosophers argue for what is called political obligation—the duty to obey the law of nearly just, legitimate states. Even proponents of civil disobedience generally hold that, given this moral duty, breaking the law requires justification. By contrast, activists from Henry David Thoreau to the Movement for Black Lives have long recognized a responsibility to resist injustice. Taking seriously this activism, this book wrestles with the problem of political obligation (...) in real world societies that harbor injustice. It argues that the very grounds supporting a duty to obey the law—grounds such as the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and associative duties—also impose obligations of resistance under unjust social conditions. The work therefore expands political obligation to include a duty to resist injustice even in legitimate states, and further shows that under certain real-world conditions, this duty to resist demands principled disobedience. Against the mainstream in public, legal, and philosophical discourse, the book argues that such disobedience need not always be civil. Sometimes, covert, violent, evasive, or offensive acts of lawbreaking can be justified, even required. Illegal assistance to undocumented migrants, leaks of classified information, hacktivism sabotage, armed self-defense, guerrilla art, and other modes of resistance are viable and even necessary forms of resistance. There are limits: principle alone does not justify lawbreaking. But uncivil disobedience can sometimes be required in the effort to resist injustice. (shrink)

Engineers have a greater responsibility than many other professionals not to commit civil disobedience in performing their jobs as engineers. It does not follow that engineers have no responsibility for their company’s actions. Morally, engineer may be required to speak out within the company or even publicly against her company. An engineer may be required to work on a project or quit her job. None of these acts, generally, are against the law. An engineer may be morally required to commit (...) civil disobedience as a private citizen. But, given the institutional character of engineering and the division of labor in the modern world, very rarely will conscience require an engineer to violate the law in the performance of her job as an engineer. (shrink)

The everyday virtue of civility functions as a constraint upon informal social pressures. Can civility also be understood, as John Rawls has proposed, as a distinctively political constraint? I contrast Rawls's project of constraining the political with Mill's of constraining both the social and the political, and explore Rawls's account of the relation between the two. I argue that Rawls's political duty of civility rests on the assumption that the political is peculiarly coercive; ignores the social (...) enforcement of morality; and implausibly has civility apply to motives in acting, rather than to actions. (shrink)

For many centuries now, those considering themselves civilized have carried out numerous atrocities—from abductions to dispossession to massacres—against those thought to be less civilized, all in the name of civilization. This has particularly been the case in the last 500 years when Europeans came into contact with indigenous peoples in their voyages of discovery and subsequent settlement. One of the justifications for these offences was often couched in terms of the self-appointed duty of “civilized” Europeans to bring the blessings (...) of civilization to the “savage” and “barbarian” hordes, also called the “white man's burden” or the “burden of civilization.” Many nations took up this sacred trust of civilization and the challenge of bringing enlightenment and salvation to the uncivilized peoples of the world, during which the latter were either subjugated or perished. In this article I trace the intellectual heritage of the sacred trust and note its inherent contradictions, ranging from debates between Sepúlveda and Las Casas over Spain's rights of conquest in the New World to the musings of key Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Hegel, Kant, and J. S. Mill. As some of its advocates acknowledge the sacred trust and concomitant civilizing missions were inevitably and invariably violent and went against the very idea of civilization. And as Las Casas deftly highlighted, much of the reasoning underpinning the sacred trust was in the form of “poisons disguised with honey.”. (shrink)

The political liberalism of Rawls and Larmore is presented as uniquely able to solve the problems of modern political theory. In the face of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good, a legitimate liberal state can legislate solely on the basis of a modular conception of justice affirmed from within each reasonable conception. However, it is argued that this view, while restrictive, has to permit the promotion of its own pre-conditions. This demanding duty of civic restraint requires (...) citizens who have been educated for citizen virtue in the context of associational life in civil society. This challenge to expand liberalism to cover its own preconditions at the level of a moral background culture, has usually been levelled by one kind of republican/communitarian (Charles Taylor) or so-called "ethical liberals". It can be met by the adoption of a liberal republicanism that operates within the constraints of Rawls' political liberalism but nevertheless explains and justifies why such a view must treat traditional republican themes such as active citizenship and the importance of associational life. The solution lies in treating these values as option values, in a sense that is explained. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in (...) a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism. (shrink)

Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by (...) being costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the educational relevance of civil disobedience as a form of political dissent in contemporary democracies demonstrating signs of significant democratic decline. The article challenges the plausibility of the impactful Rawlsian understanding of civil disobedience in societies in a state of democratic backsliding. As an alternative, the article builds on Candice Delmas's definition of civil disobedience as a form of political action that is justified by citizens' political duty to resist injustice. I argue that to (...) enable citizens to effectively discharge this duty, public schools should teach civil disobedience as part of democratic education. This argument is founded on the presumption that civil disobedience is a particularly effective means, first, for inducing the type of systemic change needed to support democracy in the long run and, second, for resisting serious forms of injustice in nonideal societal circumstances. The article further describes what teaching for civil disobedience should entail and defends this form of education against potential objections. (shrink)

Delmas successfully guides us to reconsider the traditional “wisdom” of civil disobedience. She also makes a strong case for expanding the notion of political obligation, which has been narrowly construed as mere obedience, to encompass a duty to resist. Principled disobedience, either civil or uncivil, includes a wide range of tools to tackle different forms of injustice, such as education campaigns, peaceful protests, graffiti street art, whistleblowing, vigilante self-defense, and political riots. We may question to what extent the violent (...) disobedience can be justified, as it is always good to be careful about violence that risks harming the innocent, but other forms of civil or uncivil disobedience may rightly be demanded in realistic circumstances. As I see it, these, along with the general warning to not unwittingly serve the status quo by dismissing social movements merely because of “incivility” and the proposal of the civic virtues of vigilance and open-mindedness, are significant contributions to the literature and could also benefit a politically interested general audience greatly. (shrink)

The words "violence" and "nonviolence" are increasingly misleading translations for the Sanskrit words hiṃsā and ahiṃsā -- which were used by Gandhi as the basis for his philosophy of satyāgraha. I argue for re-reading hiṃsā as “maleficence” and ahiṃsā as “beneficence.” These two more mind-referring English words – associated with religiously contextualized discourse of the past -- capture the primacy of intention implied by Gandhi’s core principles, better than “violence” and “nonviolence” do. Reflecting a political turn in moral accountability detectable (...) through linguistic data, both the scope and the usage of the word “violence” have expanded dramatically. The expanded scope of “violence” reflects greater consciousness of the various forms that serious harm can take, but also makes it harder to convincingly characterize people and actions as “nonviolent.” New translations could clarify the distinction between hiṃsā and ahiṃsā, and thereby prevent some misunderstandings of Gandhi. Training in beneficence would reflect Gandhi’s psychological path to reducing avoidable harm: detachment from the ego, learning to love universally, and seeking truth by experiment. (shrink)

For years business ethics has limited the moral duties of enterprises to negative duties. Over the last decade it has been argued that positive duties also befall commercial agents, at least when confronted with large scale public problems and when governments fail. The argument that enterprises have positive duties is often grounded in the political nature of commercial life. It is argued that agents must sometimes take over governmental responsibilities. The German republican tradition argues along these lines as does Nien-Hé (...) Hsieh. Agents in commercial life are bound by positive duties because at some point they become citizens that must take on the responsibilities of the state. In this paper we leave undisputed the claim that corporations must acknowledge positive duties. However, we demonstrate that the political grounding fails, at least in the sense that this theory insufficiently acknowledges a long standing liberal tradition that vindicates apolitical markets and clear borderlines between politics and economics. We carve out an alternative route to the grounding of one specific positive duty—the duty to further justice. Our argument is based on the moral nature of commercial agents and tries to demonstrate that the duty to further justice ensues from liberalism. Taking a Kantian perspective, it conceptualizes the duty to further justice as a moral duty, orientated toward the political domain. It is grounded in the obligation to attain moral autonomy in the civil condition. (shrink)

Activities protesting against major polluters who cause climate change may cause damage to private property in the process. This paper investigates the case for a more international general basis of moral justification for such protests. Specific reference is made to the Kingsnorth case, which involved a protest by Greenpeace against coal-powered electricity generation in the UK. An appeal is made to Rawlsian fairness arguments, traditionally employed to support the obligation of citizens to their national governments as opposed to their international (...) duties. The argument made here, however, is that there seem to be sufficient reasons for holding that a stable climate is one of the first truly global public goods that is indispensable to acceptable standards of living everywhere. This would suffice to justify international and intergenerational ‘atmospheric’ political obligations, which in turn may justify protests – even those causing some damage to private property – against the laws and policies that violate the fair terms of cooperation in providing a stable climate. The fairness argument aims also to provide a ground from which Green political theory could integrate accounts of radical forms of citizenship into appeals to state political authority. This leads to justifying acts of civil disobedience on the basis of novel understandings of ‘atmospheric’ citizenship obligations. (shrink)

A concept of responsibility as an inalienable feature of free self-execution of a person is discovered in the given article. The main attention is paid to the existential nature of responsibility which is a specific source of its social dimension. Creative potential of responsible human-creator is analysed in contrast to spiritual emptiness, losing of a reason for own existence. Demarcation between the concept of responsibility and notion of duty is proposed by the author. A specific nature of anthropocentric ethics (...) of dominance is determined in contrast to ecological ethics of responsibility. Horizon of future development of the society is foreseen on the basis of its virtual image correlation with recognition of dignity of another person and responsibility of the person for his/her self-execution that is determined by civil cultural environment. Key words : person, responsibility, social responsibility, reason for existence, self-execution, duty, anthropocentrism, naturologism (ecologism), horizon of future. (shrink)

Engineers have a greater responsibility than many other professionals not to commit civil disobedience in performing their jobs as engineers. It does not follow that engineers have no responsibility for their company’s actions. Morally, engineer may be required to speak out within the company or even publicly against her company. An engineer may be required to work on a project or quit her job. None of these acts, generally, are against the law. An engineer may be morally required to commit (...) civil disobedience as a private citizen. But, given the institutional character of engineering and the division of labor in the modern world, very rarely will conscience require an engineer to violate the law in the performance of her job as an engineer. (shrink)

What sorts of reasons should citizens have in mind when they cast votes? Arguments from both sides of the EU referendum debate are used here to raise questions about what our motivations should be when voting. The article introduces John Rawls's requirement to give public reasons that are acceptable to all reasonable people.

When the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun (1279-1290) moves to Syria with her army to fight the Mongols, martial law is declared in Egypt. Kalavun's son as heir Salih Ali in Egypt, published to Zaynaddin Ketboğa a tazkire that dated April-1281 containing the martial law decisions. Tezkire talks about the duties and responsibilities of administrators in the context of state-security-service. These decisions are important state affairs in the flow of daily life such as the judiciary, law, justice, security, transportation, service, trade, land, (...) fair tax system, control of civil servants and state affairs. In addition, the healthy living conditions of the detainees, It also includes issues such as meeting the needs of the detainees such as churches and baths. Tazkire decisions aiming to ensure the flow of daily life in Egypt during wartime without causing a possible instability are always valid state policies aiming at state order and social welfare. In our article, we will talk about this tezkire, which was narrated as a full text by İbnü'l-Furât (d. 1405) and Kalkaşendî (d. 1418). (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the question of who has duties regarding poverty and what those duties demand, from within the perspective of contemporary analytic normative philosophy. The chapter is structured in three sections. Section 1 considers the duties of those living in poverty, which might be either self-regarding or other-regarding duties, and which must be tempered by concerns of overdemandingness. Section 2 considers the duties of affluent individuals. These are imperfect duties grounded in affluent individuals’ relations to the structures that (...) produce poverty: relations of contribution, benefit, and ability to change. Section 3 considers duties of collective agents – including states, for-profits, charities, and civil society groups. The poverty-related duties of these collective agents are sometimes perfect and sometimes imperfect, and include both primary and secondary duties, and both positive and negative duties. (shrink)

While Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is often seen to involve voluntary and deliberative approaches such as certification, governments have recently stepped into the picture through national legislation. France’s Law on Duty of Vigilance adopted in 2017 is a landmark case of such legislation. Years of voluntary CSR certification schemes led by Civil Society were replaced by a new philosophy of fighting for mandatory CSR controlled by a judge. We depict the change of mindset and the related change of roles (...) inside the coalition of Civil Society actors represents a Machiavellian Moment. The combination of collective civil society actors’ roles (namely nongovernmental organizations and labor unions) as Machiavellian _Virtue_ with disruptive events as Machiavellian _Fortuna_ made the law’s adoption possible. Based on this case study, we provide an analysis of civil society roles in the development of CSR-related legislation. (shrink)

The article deals with the analysis of the problem of civil socialization of youth in Ukraine in conditions of postmodern information society. The authors analyze definitions and main characteristics of civil socialization, define the role of information and communication in the process of civil socialization of youth, outline mechanisms of civil socialization of youth in the information society, represent the results of the conducted survey dealing with the peculiarities of civil socialization of the youth of Ukraine in postmodern information society. (...) The conclusion has been made that the process of civil socialization of youth in conditions of postmodern information society involves the youth’s adoption of social norms regulating the relations of power, self-identification with certain political groups, integration and implementation of active patterns of political behavior. The result of civil socialization is the formation of civic-mindedness, which is a multilevel information and communication process that includes both the formation of the civil identity of an individual and the development of legal consciousness, political and civil culture. Therefore, civic-mindedness is tightly connected with the opportunities for the realization of rights and freedoms, the exercise of civil duties, and the formation of civil solidarity. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moral duties that human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and development NGOs, such as Oxfam, have in relation to human rights – especially in relation to the human right to a decent standard of living. The mentioned NGOs are powerful new agents on the global scene, and according to many they might be duty-bearers in relation to human rights. However, until now their moral duties have hardly been investigated. The present paper investigates NGO duties (...) in relation to human rights by looking in particular to a moral theory recently proposed by Leif Wenar, a theory which has some similarities to utilitarianism. In applying this theory, a case for human-rights duties of NGOs is developed mainly by considering the indispensable role that civil society plays in protecting human rights. The paper concludes that, at least, NGOs bear duties with regard to human rights when, as in certain real-life cases, NGO involvement is the only way to achieve acceptable protection against standard threats to certain goods, such as a decent standard of living. (shrink)

Those arguing that conscientious objection in medicine should be declared unethical by professional societies face the following challenge: conscientious objection can function as an important reforming mechanism when it involves health care workers refusing to participate in certain medical interventions deemed standard of care and legally sanctioned but which undermine patients’ rights. In such cases, the argument goes, far from being unethical, conscientious objection may actually be a professional duty. I examine this sort of challenge and ultimately argue that (...) these acts of conscience done in the interest of reforming professional norms or medical regulations are best understood as episodes of civil disobedience rather than episodes of conscientious objection. In contrast to the private, exempting nature of conscientious objection, civil disobedience is a public breach of a norm or law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in governmental policies or professional standards. Consequently, clinicians may have a duty to engage in civil disobedience even while professional societies are right to declare limitations on the ethical appropriateness of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Several months ago, an Israeli resident in emergency medicine engaged in a hunger strike to protest 26-hour shifts. His protest was part of a country-wide struggle of medical residents from all disciplines against such long shifts, arguing that they are a thing of the past, and that they harm patient care. While there is actually no evidence that long shifts harm patient outcomes, they very likely reduce civility among staff members and towards patients.1 Two kinds of strategies are possible (...) to address this likely source of incivility: expect and train residents to be kinder and more patient towards their peers and patients, or do away with long shifts. Therein lies the tension in implementing the case for civility made by McCollough et al 2 should we invest in agent-based or system-based interventions? Virtue ethics is prominent in discussions of the professional duties of healthcare providers (HCPs). A common theme that threads throughout these discussions is that HCPs ought to, or are expected to behave in a kind, patient and sensitive manner towards their peers and patients, …. (shrink)

This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to emphasize the genuineness and importance of peaceful coexistence values among religions and cultures in Islamic civilization. It specifically focuses on the interaction with others, living together, acknowledging, respecting, and collaborating with them in different aspects of shared humanity. This research examines the language of extremism by studying and analyzing it, seeing it as the primary obstacle to the principles of civic coexistence and tolerance. The research findings indicate that the key factor that sets (...) apart the principles of peaceful coexistence among individuals, irrespective of their religious and racial backgrounds, and that necessitates the acceptance of others in Islamic ideology, is the perception of such acceptance as legitimate obligations. An individual is recognized as a Muslim only when they openly acknowledge their adherence to the Islamic faith. Through the analysis of holy writings and the Prophet's biography, the researcher concludes that any radical and divisive rhetoric that promotes the rejection of peaceful coexistence cannot be regarded as Islamic speech, and does not accurately reflect Islam and Muslims. Instead, it is an extreme rhetoric that only represents its advocates, a rhetoric that Islam disavows, just as it disavows other forms of hate speech. The research urges the official religious authorities in Arab and Islamic countries to take on the legitimate, ethical, and scientific duty of freeing religious matters from ideological manipulation and restoring the correct approach to interpreting religious texts, while avoiding extremist ideological exploitation. This proposal advocates for the promotion of harmony, resolution of misunderstandings, fostering love and unity, prevention of excommunication, defamation, and conflict. It suggests the establishment of educational programs focused on promoting peace and coexistence values, as well as encouraging research in the field of tolerance education and acceptance of others. The objective is to cultivate an intellectual atmosphere in our universities that prioritizes wisdom, reason, logic, and evidence over emotional slogans. This will result in universities producing graduates who possess values of tolerance and coexistence, equipped to challenge and dismantle hateful and extremist ideologies by exposing their flaws and removing the religious facade from their harmful ideas. (shrink)

In this article I define civil disobedience and classify it into four forms based on motive and extent of dissent. I then present Thomas Aquinas's account for justified civil disobedience. After first determining how a law or system of laws is unjust, the duty (virtue) of obedience to just and unjust laws is discussed. Finally, I argue that of the four possible forms of civil disobedience, Aquinas's natural Law Theory only clearly allows the fourth, i.e., altruistic disobedience of an (...) unjust system of rule, while at times also apparently allowing the third, i.e., altruistic disobedience of an unjust law. (shrink)